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I. Singapore's Attractive Investment Climate
Since its independence in 1965 Singapore has successfully practiced an
open-door policy towards foreign investment. From a dearth of interna-
tional investment in the 1960s, Singapore became a major regional man-
ufacturing and financial center with more than 60,000 companies, domestic
and foreign, officially registered by the early 1980s.I
The modern city of Singapore was founded on February 6, 1819, when
Sir Stamford Raffles concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance with
the rulers of the island to establish a "factory" for the British East India
Company. 2 By treaty of 1824 the island completely surrendered to the
Company and recognized the British right to occupation. In 1826 the
British Crown issued Letters Patent, called the "Second Charter of Jus-
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tThe Editorial Reviewer for this article is James A. DeMent, Jr.
I. See Strait from the Top, BusINEss TRAVELLER, July 1985, at 57-58. Prior to indepen-
dence, Singapore was already an important entrepot and functioned as a base for the British
Armed Forces.
2. For history, see Bartholomew, The Singapore Legal System, in SINGAPORE: SOCIETY
IN TRANSITION 84-112 (R. Hassan ed. 1976).
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tice," creating Singapore's first formal judicial system. 3 In 1867 the Colony
of the Straits Settlement was organized, consisting of Singapore, Penang,
and Malacca. 4 Apart from the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945,
Singapore's status as a British Crown Colony lasted until 1959,! when it
became self-governing. 5 Following a short alliance with the Federation of.
Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, Singapore proclaimed itself an independent
republic in 1965.6 Today, Singapore, along with Malaysia, is a member of
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 7
Singapore experienced uninterrupted growth for over twenty-five years
until the decline of growth during the mid-1980s. Its attractiveness to
foreign investment has many roots. Foremost is the country's location.
Surrounded by deep waters, at the crossroads of air and sea routes be-
tween Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and Australia, Singapore devel-
oped naturally into a major regional entrepot and port. By 1983, its harbor
was the world's second-busiest, shipping Southeast Asian oil, rubber, and
manufactured goods throughout the world.8
Singapore also has an excellent infrastructure. It has a sophisticated
telecommunications system and a good network of roads throughout the
island. The country is within easy reach by air or sea and, with only 226
square miles and 2.4 million people, it is of a more manageable size than
its larger neighbors. 9 Its size also forced Singapore to concentrate on
exports, a policy that has reaped many rewards.' 0
The characteristics of Singapore's residents contribute further to Sin-
gapore's development. Singaporeans are predominantly Chinese (76 per-
3. P. PILLAI, STATE ENTERPRISE IN SINGAPORE: LEGAL IMPORTATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT 24 (1983).
4. Penang and Malacca are now part of Malaysia.
5. In 1946 the Straits Settlement was dissolved, and Singapore became a separate Crown
Colony.
6. The bond with Malaysia fell apart mainly because the Chinese, who were the dominant
group in Singapore, feared domination by the Malay, the dominant group in Malaysia.
Although economically the Chinese are a powerful group in Malaysia, politically they often
suffer discrimination.
7. Inaugurated by the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, actual cooperation between the
ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) began only
after the Bali Summit of 1976. See Chow Kit Boey, Asean Economic Cooperation and
Singapore, in SINGAPORE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT 341-64 (You Poh Seng
& Lim Chong Yah eds. 1984) [hereinafter SINGAPORE: 25 YEARS].
8. Future of 'Plato's Republic'; A Rough Road Ahead, INSIGHT, May 12, 1986, at 16
[hereinafter Future of 'Plato's Republic'].
9. Compare the population of Malaysia (14.5 million) and Indonesia (165 million) with
that of Singapore (2.4 million).
10. See KUNIO YOSHIHARA, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC RESPONSE, A STUDY
OF SINGAPORE'S INDUSTRIALIZATION 13 (1976) [hereinafter K. Yoshihara]. Most developing
countries practice import substitution. Although the home industry then develops in a
protected environment, local companies are often unable to compete worldwide at a later
time.
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cent), with the remainder being Malay (15 percent), Indian (7 percent),
and Eurasian and European (together 3 percent). Generally, most people
speak English because Singapore chose to expand its usage rather than
abolish it. Most people also are well educated, thanks to the high edu-
cational standards set by the British and maintained following indepen-
dence. The result is a multiracial, cosmopolitan city with an appealing
atmosphere to locals and foreigners alike."l
Equally important to many is Singapore's strong, consistent, and con-
cerned leadership, dominated by the People's Action Party (PAP) under
one leader, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. 12 The People's Action Party was formed
in 1954 by moderate, British trained social democrats (led by Mr. Lee)
together with communist-oriented Chinese. 13 When Singapore achieved
self-government in 1959, Mr. Lee, then thirty-six years old, became Prime
Minister, a post he still holds. Initially the communist party was strong,
appealing more to the masses, many of whom were unemployed and
poorer than the mostly British-educated members of the PAP Following
Singapore's separation from Malaysia, however, the communists suffered
a major setback, 14 and since then the PAP has ruled practically unop-
posed. 15 Only in 1981 and 1984 did two opposition.parties win one seat
each out of the seventy-nine seats in Parliament.16
II. Singapore's Government Sector
Working for Singapore's prosperity and survival, Lee Kuan Yew heavily
promoted a free market nation. Even though communists had helped him
to power in 1959, Mr. Lee was concerned that they would deter foreign
11. The cosmopolitan atmosphere is enhanced by Singapore's many shopping centers
and fine hotels.
12. Singapore is a parliamentary democracy. Every citizen over twenty-one years of age
must vote. Parliament is unicameral and consists of seventy-nine members. The President,
who is elected by Parliament for four-year terms, is a mere figurehead, the real power being
with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and his British-style cabinet of 14 members.
See P. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 24.
13. Id. at 25-27.
14. See K. YOSHIHARA, supra note 10, at 2-3.
15. In 1969 the Presidential Council for Minority Rights was created to grant minority
groups a voice in government; however, the Council was denied the right to vote. See
P. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 24.
16. In October 1981 the Worker's Party leader, Mr. J.B. Jeyaretnam broke PAP's thirteen-
year monopoly. The December 1984 election showed a 13 percent swing against the PAP,
with two seats (one to Mr. Jeyaretnam) going to the opposition. See Singapore: Challenge
and Response, FAR-EASTERN ECON. REV., July 11, 1985, at 34-44. See also Lee Kuan Yew
v. J.B. Jeyaretnam, [1979] 19 MALAYAN L.J. 281, a case in which the Prime Minister won
a libel action against Mr. Jeyaretnam, who in an election speech, in 1976, had accused Mr.
Lee of favoritism toward his wife and brother, both former law partners in the firm of Lee
& Lee.
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investments, which he considered vital to bolster and sustain the island.
Nevertheless, Singapore remains a highly regulated society with the Gov-
ernment deeply involved with business. 17 The purpose of governmental
involvement has been not only to create and maintain the type of infra-
structure that would attract private business, but also to prevent failures
of a free market and to create an environment in which all people could
attain a reasonable standard of living. As a result, the Government remains
involved with economic development, finance, housing, education, re-
tirement and social security, and public transportation, among other
activities.
Singapore's Economic Development Board (EDB) was established in
1961 with an initial capitalization of S$100 million to guide, promote,
assist, finance, and manage economic development. 18 With offices world-
wide, EDB currently advises the Government on industrial policy and
assists in carrying out that policy. 19 Singapore's finances are controlled
tightly by the Monetary Authority (MAS), created in 1971. MAS is the
financial agent and banker to the Government and exercises all the func-
tions of a Central Bank except for the issuance of currencies, which is
the responsibility of the Board of Commissioners of Currency.20
Housing, a prime example of Singapore's achievement, is handled by
the Housing and Development Board (HDB) created in 1960.21 The HDB
now provides public housing for over 75 percent of the population. This
building activity also helped in reducing unemployment during the early
years of Singapore's independence.
Education is encouraged for all citizens, and the most promising stu-
dents are put on an accelerated schedule. 22 Since the mid-1970s the Gov-
ernment has concentrated on promoting and expanding technonological and
engineering skills. 23
17. The Government owns all or part of some 500 businesses. See A Hard Landing
Awaits Singapore, FORTUNE, Jan. 20, 1986, at 97-99.
18. EDB was preceded by the Singapore Industrial Promotion Board, which failed for
lack of capital. See K. YOSHIHARA, supra note 10, at 20.
19. A discussion of the EDB appears in P. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 128-56.
20. See SINGAPORE: 25 YEARS, supra note 7, at 125-30; see also TAN CHWEE HUAT,
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS IN SINGAPORE 8 (4th ed. 1985).
21. See Quah, Public Housing, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SINGAPORE 233-58
(Quah, Chee & Meow eds. 1985).
22. See Future of 'Plato's Republic', supra note 8, at 16. For instance, in a "nurture
over nature" approach, the Government organizes parties for educated young persons to
get acquainted. Also, in 1984/1985 the Government guaranteed third children of graduated
mothers (i.e., those with a degree) privileged treatment in the school system. Second children
of uneducated mothers were promised preferred school enrollment (but with a lower pref-
erence than the prior group), provided their mothers agreed to sterilization. Because of
public outcry, the Government discontinued this policy during 1985.
23. Around 1975 Singapore began promoting high technology industries through a high-
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To guarantee all its citizens a secure retirement, Singapore created the
Central Provident Fund in 1965. Employer and employee each must con-
tribute a relatively large percentage of salary. With the exception of hous-
ing purchases from the HDB, Singaporeans do not have access to their
retirement funds until age fifty-five. Meanwhile amounts accumulated in
the Central Provident Fund provide the Government with resources for
its many social programs. 24
Singapore Airlines, partially owned by the Government, has built a
respectable name in air transport. 25 Another public/private corporation,
the Singapore Bus Service, provides an extensive well-run bus opera-
tion. 26 The biggest project currently undertaken by the Government is
the construction of an enormous Mass Rapid Transit project for under-
ground transport. 27
III. Singapore's Anticorruption Law
Colonial Singapore had been rampant with bribery, nepotism, misap-
propriation of public funds, irregularities in licensing, and underassess-
ment of taxes. To thwart the growth of communism as well as to dem-
onstrate that market societies need not necessarily be corrupt, Mr. Lee
initiated several strong measures against corruption. 28
In 1960 the Government enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act
(POCA) with stiff penalties for those in public or private organizations
who either offer or accept bribes. 29 If convicted, public officers and private
organizations may receive prison terms of up to seven years and S$10
wage, high-cost policy that would add high values to its products, seeking to reserve highly
skilled jobs for its small population. This policy backfired. Costs have risen faster than
productivity, affecting Singapore's competitiveness relative to neighboring countries. See
Singapore's Shift Offers Quick Aid for Bottom Lines, Ambitious Long-Term Goals, Bus.
INT'L, May 12, 1986, at 146-47 [hereinafter Singapore's Shift].
24. See Low, Public Enterprises in Singapore, in SINGAPORE: 25 YEARS, supra note 7,
at 256. Until April 1, 1986, when the employer's contribution was reduced to 10 percent,
employer and employee each had to pay 25 percent of salaries. The 25 percent rule continues
to apply for the employee's share. The employer's share was reduced, to revitalize Sin-
gapore's floundering economy. See Singapore's Shift, supra note 23, at 146-47.
25. The Government sold 100 million shares of Singapore Airlines to the public in No-
vember 1985 to promote increased interest in the Singapore stock market, which is suffering
under the recession. See A Hard Landing Awaits Singapore, supra note 17, at 98.
26. P. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 173.
27. See Low, supra note 24, at 262. The Mass Rapid Transit Corporation was inaugurated
on October 22, 1982. Since many Singaporeans no longer work as manual laborers, con-
struction workers are mostly Koreans and other foreigners.
28. P. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 123.
29. Prevention of Corruption Act, Ch. 104, 3 Singapore Rev. Stat. 221 (1960), as amended,
3 Singapore Rev. Stat. 287 (Supp. 1972). POCA was preceded by the generally ineffective
Prevention of Corruption Ordinance of 1937.
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thousand in fines. 30 At the same time salaries of public servants have
been increased gradually to levels deemed more realistic. 31
To ensure compliance with POCA, the Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau (CPIB), the enforcement agency established by POCA, was given
broad investigative and enforcement powers. The CPIB operates in secret
and, since 1970, has been under the supervision of the Prime Minister's
Office. Thus governmental departments and statutory boards find it pru-
dent to cooperate with the CPIB. 32 The CPIB may trace bank accounts
of anyone suspected of violating POCA and may conduct unannounced
searches and seizures of offices or homes. Since enactment, enforcement
under POCA has been vigorous without regard to status or position. Cases
have been brought, for example, against senior officers of the Public
Utilities Board and the Port of Singapore Authority. Police officers have
been blacklisted for fraudulently collecting money, and a raid was con-
ducted on a finance company.33
IV. The 1967 Companies Act
Singapore's open, accessible, clean environment make it a haven for
foreign investment. Doing business in Singapore is regulated by the Com-
panies Act of 1967, which is based on Australian and English company
law. 34 The Companies Act contains provisions on, among other matters,
incorporation and directors' duties.
A. INCORPORATION
Private companies, public companies, and branches of foreign com-
panies may be registered in Singapore. A company may be limited by
30. S$ means Singapore dollar, which is about half the U.S. dollar. In January 1987 one
U.S. dollar could be exchanged for approximately 2.07 Singapore dollars.
31. On corruption, see generally Quah, Administrative and Legal Measures for Com-
batting Bureaucratic Corruption in Singapore, in OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 34 (Singapore:
Eurasia Press 1978).
32. One commentator has observed that "[in the Singapore bureaucracy, the CPIB is
feared as the PAP leadership's all-seeing eye, and is respected for its near-clockwork effi-
ciency and its sophisticated operational methods. The CPIB's formidable name in Chinese
is 'Foul Greed Investigation Bureau'." See Quah, supra note 31, at 14.
33. See id. at 18-19.
34. The basic law on companies was enacted in the Companies Act of 1967, revised in
the Companies Act, Ch. 185 of the 1970 Edition, and amended in 1970, 1973, 1974. 1975
and 1984. In 1985 the Companies Act was reprinted and renumbered (this article fc'Iows
the new numbering). See also the Business Registration Act of 1973, Ch. 36, at 493 (Sdpp.
1973), which regulates partnerships, and the Securities Industry Act of 1973, Ch. 17, at 321
(Supp. 1973), as amended by the Securities Industries Act 1986 (effective August 1986),
dealing with securities. The latter Act builds on U.S. securities law.
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shares or by guarantee, or it may be unlimited. 35 A limited company may
be public or private. Public companies may offer their shares for sale to
the public and list their stock on the Stock Exchange of Singapore.
36
Private companies must limit the number of shareholders to fifty and
restrict the transfer of shares. They may not raise money by invitation to
the public. 37
The incorporation process consists of filing with the Registrar a mem-
orandum of association (roughly equivalent to articles of incorporation
in U.S. jurisprudence) and articles of association (roughly equivalent to
bylaws in U.S. jurisprudence), together with the required fee and, since
1984, a declaration of compliance. 38 The Registrar then issues a certificate
of incorporation. 39 The company must have a minimum of two directors,
one of whom must reside in Singapore.40 Shareholders need not reside
in Singapore. Also, Singapore requires no local equity participation and
applies few exchange restrictions. 4
1
The Act requires a Singapore company to have a registered office in
Singapore42 and to maintain certain records such as registers of members,
directors, directors' holdings, managers, and secretaries, and a minute
book of meetings. 43 Public companies are required to keep, in addition,
a register of individuals with substantial interests in the company's share
capital. A Singapore company must file its audited financial statements
annually with the Registrar of Companies. A branch of a foreign company
must file two different balance sheets, one required by the law of the
country of incorporation to be filed within two months of the foreign
company's annual general meeting, and another arising out of its Singa-
pore operations. 44 If this dual filing poses an unreasonable burden for a
company, the Registrar may order relief.45
35. Sections 4 and 17(2) of the Companies Act. In a limited company, shareholders limit
liability to their shareholdings or guarantee. An unlimited company exposes shareholders
to unlimited liability. But see section 17(5) of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1984, which
prohibits registration of companies limited by guarantee.
36. See the Companies Act, part IV, sections 43-56 for requirements of public offerings.
37. Section 18(1) of the Companies Act. A private company with fewer than twenty
members, none of which is a corporation, may be exempt from filing certain reports with
the Registrar.
38. Sections 19(1) and (2) of the Companies Act.
39. Section 19(4) of the Companies Act.
40. Section 145(1) of the Companies Act.
41. TAN CHWEE HUAT, supra note 20, at 10.
42. Section 142(1) of the Companies Act.
43. See Companies Act, Part V, Management and Administration, Division 4-Register
of Members, §§ 190-196 and Division 5-Annual Return, §§ 197-198.
44. Section 373 of the Companies Act.
45. Section 373(7) as adopted by the 1984 Companies (Amendment) Act.
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B. DIRECTORS' DUTIES
Generally, directors owe shareholders a duty of loyalty and a duty of
care. As fiduciaries, the loyalty obligation requires directors to place the
company's interest ahead of their own. Section 157 of the 1967 Companies
Act states that "a director shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable
diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office" and "not make
improper use of any information acquired by virtue of his position as an
officer or agent of the company to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage
for himself or for any other person or to cause a detriment to the com-
pany.' 46 For instance, a director may not serve two masters, profit se-
cretly, or usurp an opportunity belonging to the corporation. The duty of
care requires a director to exercise that degree of care and skill that might
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience. 47
A director generally satisfies this duty when he acts to the best of his
capabilities in the interest of the company.
The Companies Act adds many statutory duties. For instance, a director
must consider the interests of employees and shareholders, 4 8 must keep
accounts, 49 appoint auditors, 50 and abstain from fraudulent trading. 51 These
duties, common law and statutory, all seek to protect investors against
abuse and misuse by directors and the companies operated under their
supervision. 52
46. Sections 157(1) and (2) of the Companies Act.
47. See C. TAY SWEE KlAN & TANG SEE CHIM, DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND LIABILITIES
53 (1985) [hereinafter TAY]; see also Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., [1975] Ch.
407, which states:
I. A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than
may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience....
2. A director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his company. His
duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board meetings and
at meetings of any committee of the board upon which he happens to be placed. He
is not, however, bound to attend all such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever,
in the circumstances, he is reasonably able to do so....
3. In respect of all duties, that having regard to the exigencies of business and the articles
of association, may properly be left to some other officials, a director is, in the absence
of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such duties
honestly....
48. Section 159 of the Companies Act.
49. Section 199 of the Companies Act.
50. Section 205 of the Companies Act. Auditors now must be appointed within three
months after incorporation.
51. Section 340 of the Companies Act.
52. The importance Singapore attaches to directors' duties is apparent in the following:
The developing countries, specially those which used to be corrupt and are in the process
of eradicating corruption, face special dangers from loose (and publicly flouted) regulation
of companies, when they are under threat from communist subversion.For the communists
often pose as being highly moral and ethical, as opposed to the establishment which is
portrayed as oppressive of the poor, ridden by nepotism and flouters of the rule of law,
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C. LIMITED INSURANCE
The Companies Act invalidates any provision in the articles, contractual
or otherwise, that exempts or indemnifies a director for negligence, de-
fault, or breach of duty or trust. 53 Articles or contract may, however,
indemnify a director out of the assets of the company for liability incurred
in defending cases, civil or criminal, decided in the director's favor.54
Furthermore, even if it appears to the court that the director is guilty of
negligence, default, or breach of duty or trust, the court may still grant
relief if in its opinion the director acted honestly and reasonably, and in
fairness ought fairly to be excused. 55
V. The 1984 Companies (Amendment) Act5 6
With the increased level of business activity taking place in Singapore,
many practices developed to circumvent existing laws-. For instance, at-
torneys, bankers, accountants, and others would incorporate companies
with a nominal capital of a few dollars, under an internationally known
name, and with themselves as directors. These dormant companies then
could be sold "off the shelf" to investors wanting to save the time and
paperwork of registering their own companies. 57 In addition, many com-
panies did not meet annually, as is required by the 1967 Companies Act,
and did not file returns with the Registrar.58 In some instances when a
and if company law is publicly unenforced in the face of real or imagined widespread
abuses whereby the common people suffer serious losses, this helps the communists to
subvert existing governments. The dilemma is that while overstrict application of dra-
conian company laws may scare away foreign investors, too easy enforcement will help
the subversive elements, but the solution is obvious-to take the middle way.
A. SINGH, DIRECTOR'S LIABILITIES IN SINGAPORE & MALAYSIA AFTER TARLING'S CASE
(1981).
53. Section 172(l) of the Companies Act.
54. Section 172(2) of the Companies Act. See also article 113 of Table A, Fourth Schedule
to the Act, which reads that "every director ... shall be indemnified out of the assets of
the company against any liability incurred by him in defending any proceedings, whether
civil or criminal, in which judgment is given in his favour ... in which relief is granted to
him by the Court in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust."
55. Section 391 of the Companies Act.
56. For a general review, see Woon, The Companies (Amendment) Act 1984: The Regis-
trar's Shopping List-Some Problems Introduced by the Companies (Amendment) Act 1984,
26 MALAYA L. REV. 309 (1984).
57. See Solicitors are Now Reluctant to be Company Directors, The Singapore Monitor,
Sept. 11, 1984, reprinted in TAY, supra note 47, at 82.
58. According to the Straits Times, Oct. 9, 1984, reprinted in TAY, supra note 47, at 33,
four out of ten companies were either not filing returns on time, or were not revealing
everything that they should in their returns.
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company was doing poorly, the directors would resign their posts leaving
no one to account for poor performance. 59
The Registrar thus was losing the ability to monitor and regulate Sin-
gapore companies properly. Although the Registrar exercised pressure on
companies to file reports and refused to record resignations if fewer than
two directors would remain in office, the legality of such actions was
doubtful. Officially, the 1967 Companies Act required the filing of reports
only after a meeting was held. If the directors held no meeting, no reports
seemed necessary. Case law provides further that resignations are effec-
tive upon notification to the company in writing, or orally at a general
meeting.60 Meanwhile, the 1967 Companies Act provides that the Direc-
tors' Register, held by the Registrar, serves as prima facie evidence of
directorships. 6 1 Thus by not recording resignation notices, a director ap-
pears to continue in office.
Upon becoming independent, Singapore acquired the English legal sys-
tem, and although it is developing its own unique style, Singapore contin-
ues to look to England for major trends in the law. 62 One such trend in
England is a renewed concern with the quality, liability, and reliability of
directors, and the improved protection of investors. 63 As a result Singa-
pore proposed in 1983 to amend its Companies Act, the first substantial
revision in ten years.64 The purpose was to confer legality on certain acts
by the Registrar and, more importantly, to increase the duties and liabilities
of directors to better safeguard investors. Departing from its usual prac-
tice, apparently because of the importance of the subject matter, Parlia-
ment sent the bill to a Select Committee to solicit suggestions from business
and other interested parties. Many of the suggestions were accepted. 65
59. There was a fear that fly-by-night companies would milk Singapore investors and the
organizers then flee the country, Few such incidences actually appear to have happened.
60. E.g., Glossop v. Glossop, [1907] 2 Ch. 370.
61. Section 173(8) of the Companies Act.
62. "As a generalization one can say that English Law (including statutes) as of 27 No-
vember 1826, and current English commercial law form the underlying strata of Singapore's
law." From P. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 25. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
London still operates as a court of last resort. English legal education remains recognized
for entrance to the Singapore bar.
63. For instance, in England the 1983 Gower Report on Investor Protection proposed
that directors who had been involved with compulsory liquidations be automatically dis-
qualified from assuming other directorships. Euromarket News No. 835, Jan. 8, 1985, at 5.
But when on March 11, 1985, England consolidated its Companies Act (not a "scissors and
paste" job, but "the largest consolidation in our history") it did not adopt any of the
automatic disqualifications of directors suggested by the Gower Report. See also the 1982
British Cork Report, the final Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and
Practice (Cmnd. 8558); and the 1984 White Paper, A Revised Framework for Insolvency
Law (Cmnd. 9175).
64. Bill No. 16/83, introduced in Parliament on December 29, 1983.
65. Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Act Bill No. 16 of
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A. INCREASED POWERS FOR THE REGISTRAR
Several changes affect the powers of the Registrar. The 1984 Amend-
ments authorize the Registrar to refuse memoranda or name registra-
tions, to wind up companies, or to strike them from the companies
register.
Under earlier law the Registrar could not refuse to register a proposed
company if the objects were lawful and the tendered documents appeared
in order. Under new section 20, the Registrar need not register the mem-
orandum (and thus the company) "unless he is satisfied that all the re-
quirements of the Act in respect of the registration and of all matters
precedent and incidental thereto have been complied with." The Registrar
must also refuse registration if he determines that: (a) "the proposed
company is likely to be used for an unlawful purpose" or that; (b) "it
would be contrary to the national security or interest for the proposed
company to be registered." 66 Appeal may be taken to the Minister whose
decision is final. 67 Existing companies violating this section may be wound
up or struck from the register depending on whether they are local or
foreign. 68
Further, the Registrar may refuse registration or order a company
to change its name if the name is identical or confusingly similar to
any other business name, domestic or foreign. 69 To apprise the Registrar
of possible conflicts in company names early, the 1984 Amendments
obligate companies to reserve their name as part of the incorporation
process. 70
1983 [hereinafter Select Committee Report]. An advertisement inviting written represen-
tations on the bill was published in several newspapers on January 26, 1984. A press release
was also issued. Written representations could be submitted in Malay, Chinese, Tamil, or
English, and the closing date was February 18, 1984. Fourteen written commentaries were
received (all in English) from such diverse sources as private legal practitioners, the Law
Society, the Chamber of Commerce, Accounting Society, a bank, Price Waterhouse, and
two law professors. Six meetings were held.
66. Respectively, sections 20(1), 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act. Section 369
extends these new powers to registration of foreign companies.
67. Section 20(3) of the Companies Act.
68. Section 254(m) allows winding up by the court if "the company is being used for an
unlawful purpose or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in
Singapore or against national security or interest." Section 377(8) provides that "where the
Registrar is satisfied that a foreign company is being used for an unlawful purpose or for
purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore or against national
security or interest, he shall strike the name of the foreign company off the register and it
shall thereupon cease to be registered as a foreign company under this Division."
69. Section 27(l)(b) and (c) (first registration); Section 27(2)(a) and (b) (name change).
70. Section 27(11) of the Companies Act. Reservation is for two months, with one renewal
for the same period. Sections 27(12) and (13). During the period that a reservation remains
in force no other company has access to the same name.
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B. INCREASED DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS
The 1984 Amendments increase the duties and liabilities of directors
significantly. They create new criminal offenses for directors, disallow
resignations under certain circumstances, and create new grounds for
disqualification. The rules prohibiting loans to directors have been tight-
ened, and insider trading provisions have been revised. The purpose is
to guarantee to investors that the people who run the company are honest,
accountable, and available.
C. CRIMINALIZATION
Many actions have been criminalized, subjecting directors to fines or
jail terms. No distinction has been made between part-time or full-time,
inside or outside directors. The obligations and penalties apply across the
board. 71 All in all, the 1984 Companies Act recognizes over 100 offenses.
Penalties, for instance, run from a S$1,000 fine for a failure to issue share
certificates containing the prescribed information to five years impris-
onment or a fine up to S$ 100 thousand for violating insider trading rules. 72
D. RESTRICTED RESIGNATIONS
Although the 1967 Companies Act required that every company have
a minimum of two directors, at least one of whom resided in Singapore,
the 1984 Amendments strengthen this provision by prohibiting resignation
unless at least two directors remain, one of whom resides in Singapore. 73
Any resignation violating this provision is deemed invalid. 74 The prohi-
bition does apply if a director is required to resign because, for instance,
of individual or corporate bankruptcy or for being a "persistent defaulter." 75
E. DISQUALIFICATIONS
The 1984 Amendments refine one ground for disqualification (bank-
ruptcy) and adopt two new ones (double liquidation and persistent de-
71. Originally, the bill imposed liabilities on all directors irrespective of fault. Because
of the undue hardship, however, especially for foreign directors, that such a rule might
impose (a point particularly emphasized by the commentaries), the final Act punishes only
those directors who are actually at fault. See Select Committee Report, supra note 65.
72. Respectively, sections 149 and 155 of the Companies Act. For a list of offenses, see
TAY, supra note 47, at 61-81.
73. Section 145(1) of the Companies Act.
74. Section 145(6) of the Companies Act.
75. Section 145(7) of the Companies Act. If a foreign company is left with only one agent
in Singapore, it has twenty-one days to appoint another. Section 370(5) of the 1984 Companies
(Amendment) Act.
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fault).76 The 1967 Companies Act already prohibited a person legally
declared bankrupt from acting as a director except with permission of the
court. 77 The 1984 Amendments make it clear that the bankruptcy judg-
ment may also be made by a foreign court. The concept is, of course,
that those unable to manage their own affairs should be prohibited from
managing the affairs of others.
F. DOUBLE LIQUIDATION
This concept is carried one step further in the double liquidation pro-
vision. New section 149 disqualifies from acting as a director a person
who has been involved twice with bankrupt companies. For example, if
a person: (a) is or has been a director of Company A at any time within
three years prior to its liquidation; and (b) is or has been a director of
Company B at any time (there is no cut-off period); and (c) Company A
and Company B go into liquidation due to insolvency within five years
of each other, such person is automatically disqualified for five years from
acting as a director or taking part in any way in the management of any
Singapore company without permission of the court. The court may lift
the ban, if the director can satisfy the court that his conduct with the
liquidated firm does not make him unfit for a similar position in another
company.78 Upon conviction for violating this provision a director may
be liable for a fine up to S$10 thousand or for two years imprisonment.
76. Other previously established grounds for disqualification include becoming of unsound
mind, unjustified absences from directors' meetings for more than six months, or failure to
disclose conflicting interests. Persons seventy years and older require special permission to
be on the boards of public companies. Section 153 of the Companies Act.
77. Section 148 of the Companies Act. The debtor, however, must notify the Minister of
his request for dispensation.
78. Section 149 reads in part:
(I) where a person
(a) is or has been a director of a company which has at any time gone into liquidation
(whether while he was a director or at any time within 3 years of his ceasing to
be a director) and was insolvent at that time; and
(b) is or has been a director of another such company which has gone into liquidation
and was insolvent at that time within 5 years of the date on which the first-
mentioned company went into liquidation, and that person within a period of 5
years after the other such company referred to in paragraph (b) has gone into
liquidation, without the leave of the Court, is a director or promoter of, or is in
any way whether directly or indirectly concerned or takes part in the management
of a company, he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction
to a fine not exceeding S$10 thousand or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
2 years or to both.
(2) The Court shall not give leave under this section unless
(a) notice of intention to apply therefor has been served on the Minister and on the
Official Receiver and the Minister and the Official Receiver or either of them may
be represented at the hearing of, and may oppose the granting of, the application;
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Section 149 raises several problems for unwary directors. Since there
is no cut-off period for having been a director of the second company
(Company B), the exposure to liability may extend for an indeterminate
period of time. Also, the section fails to recognize that companies fail for
reasons other than mismanagement, 79 and even when mismanagement
causes failure, not all directors may be equally at fault. Persons registered
as nominee directors of shelf companies, who have hardly been involved
in management, could face liability for many years after they have resigned
and the companies have been sold to other investors. In addition, those
individuals who customarily accept posts as a service to their clients to
satisfy the Singapore local director requirement (such as attorneys and
accountants) run the risk of unintentionally violating the statute. If they
represent several companies, two of which go into liquidation within the
prescribed period, their remaining directorships expose them automati-
cally to liability under the statute. Foreign directors also may incur au-
tomatic liability for actions beyond their control and knowledge.
Although the double liquidation provision is modeled on English law,
a major difference applies. In England, the disqualification is not auto-
matic. The court winding up the company must make an explicit dis-
qualifying order, or the relevant authorities may apply for an order to be
issued requiring the director to ask permission before accepting other
directorships. Either way the director knows his status. 80 Moreover, the
and
(b) the applicant has satisfied the Court that his conduct as a director of any of those
companies referred to in subsection (1) did not make him unfit to be concerned
in the management of a company.
79. The double liquidation provision conclusively presumes that companies fail because
of bad management.
80. See sections 12, 13, and 14 of the U.K. Insolvency Act 1985 and sections 295-299
and 300-302 of U.K. Companies Act 1985. For instance, section 12 of the U.K. Insolvency
Act 1985 reads in part:
12.(1) The court shall make a disqualification order against a person in any case where,
on the application under this section, the court is satisfied-
(a) that he is or has been a director of a company which has at any time become
insolvent (whether while he was a director or subsequently); and
(b) that his conduct as a director of that company (either taken alone or taken together
with his conduct as a director of any other company or companies) makes him
unfit to be concerned in the management of a company.
(2) The period specified as the period of the disqualification in a disqualification order
made under this section shall not be less than two years.
(3) If it appears to the Secretary of State that it is expedient in the public interest that
a disqualification order under this section should be made against any person, an
application for the making of such an order against that person may be made-
(a) by the Secretary of State; or
(b) if the Secretary of State so directs in the case of a person who is or has been a
director of a company which is being wound up by the court in England or Wales,
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burden is not on the director to prove his fitness to manage, as in Sin-
gapore, but on the accuser to show lack of fitness. 81
G. PERSISTENT DEFAULT
New section 155 disqualifies a person, on penalty of up to a S$10
thousand fine or two years imprisonment, from acting as a director without
permission of the court if he is guilty of "persistent default" in filing
returns with the Registrar.82 A person is in "persistent default" if con-
victed of three or more offenses for not filing returns with the Registrar
or of defying three court orders to supply such returns or permit inspec-
by the official receiver.
(6) The Secretary of State or the official receiver may require the liquidator, admin-
istrator or administrative receiver of a company-
(a) to furnish him with such information with respect to any person's conduct as a
director of the company; and
(b) to produce and permit inspection of such books, papers and other records relevant
to that person's conduct as such a director, as the Secretary or the official receiver
may reasonably require for the purpose of determining whether to exercise, or
of exercising, any function of his under this section.
(7) For the purpose of this section a company becomes insolvent if
(a) the company goes into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for
the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up;
(b) an administration order is made in relation to the company; or
(c) an administrative receiver of the company is appointed, and references in this
section to a person's conduct as a director of any company or companies include,
whether that company or any of those companies has become insolvent, refer-
ences to that person's conduct in relation to any matter connected with or arising
out of the insolvency of that company.
The commentary to section 12 reads in part:
The original clause from which this section evolved was the most controversial
provision in the Bill, and underwent considerable alteration throughout all Parlia-
mentary stages. In chap. 45 of the Cork Report it was recommended that delinquent
directors should be punished by disqualification from company management for up
to 15 years. The Report also recommended that in certain serious cases of misconduct
disqualifications should be mandatory, while in others it would be a matter for the
court's discretion. In their White Paper (paras. 12-14 and 46-51) the Government
adopted a more draconian and mechanical approach whereby all directors of com-
panies undergoing compulsory liquidation would suffer automatic disqualification
unless they could exculpate themselves before a court. Clause 7 of the Bill as first
published duly embodied this principle. However, a concerted opposition in Parlia-
ment led to radical recasting of the clause through progressive stages in which the
Government, having first been defeated on a division (Hansard H.L. Vol. 459, col.
628), withdrew its original clause (Hansard H.L. Vol. 461, cols. 711-19) and subse-
quently procured the enactment of § 12 in its present form, providing a restrictively
controlled procedure for the disqualification of directors of insolvent companies.
As of Jan. 1, 1987, section 12 of the Insolvency Act 1985 has been repealed by the
Companies Directors Disqualification Act 1986, which contains provisions similar to those
of section 12.
81. England maintains a public register of such disqualified persons.
82. Section 155(1) of the Companies Act.
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tions.8 3 A certificate of the Registry testifying to such refusals or orders
is prima facie proof of the offense.84 This section obviously seeks to
bolster the Registrar's powers by giving him the power to punish directors
for failing to hold annual meetings and file returns.
This section is also derived from English law.85 Again in England, how-
ever, the court must specifically disqualify the director. In Singapore this
step is automatic, punishing the honest director along with the guilty one.
The potential problem is particularly acute for part-time or foreign ab-
sentee directors, who often lack power to compel the company to hold
annual meetings, make reports, or file returns.86
H. No DIRECTOR LOANS
The new rules prohibiting company loans to directors have been clar-
ified. The policy in opposing such loans is relatively straightforward. If
creditworthy, directors could obtain loans elsewhere; if not, they should
not place the company's assets at risk for personal gain. Consequently,
section 162 of the 1967 Companies Act prohibits companies from making
or guaranteeing loans to or for its directors.87 Section 163, adopted in
1974, prohibits director-connected company loans. Thus, if the directors
of the lending company, alone or together, have an interest of twenty
percent or more in the shares of the borrowing company, the loan is
illegal.88 "Interests in shares" include beneficial interests, interests held
through companies controlled by a person or his associates, contracts for
purchase, options, trusts, and other rights over shares.8 9 If the borrowing
company has no share capital, legality depends on whether the directors
have control.9°
Formerly, an exemption from section 162 applied when the lending of
money was "in the ordinary course of business," such as for banks. As
a result many companies, whatever their business, tended to sign "no
objection clauses" to benefit from the exemption. Section 162 now clar-
ifies that the exemption applies only to banks, finance companies, insur-
ance companies, or other companies subject to the Monetary Authority
83. Section 155(3) and (4) of the Companies Act.
84. Section 155(7) of the Companies Act.
85. Section 93 of the U.K. Companies Act 1981, and section 297 of the U.K. Consolidated
Companies Act 1985.
86. See discussion by Hicks, Disqualification of Directors for Persistent Default in Filing
Documents, Section 155, Companies Act, 27 MALAYA L. REV. 329 (1985).
87. Section 162. But with shareholder approval, full-time directors may be given loans
to buy homes.
88. Section 163(2)(a) of the Companies Act.
89. Section 7 of the Companies Act.
90. Section 163(2)(b) of the Companies Act.
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of Singapore. 91 Section 162(6) clarifies further that the term "directors"
includes spouse and children. 92 Section 163, which was adopted several
years later, already had a similar provision. 93
A third clarification relates to the lending of funds to director-connected
companies. Since it was not uncommon for companies to borrow through
related Malaysian or Hong Kong companies, section 163 now states that
director-connected company loans are also prohibited if the borrowing
company is incorporated outside Singapore. 94 Violation of either section
by the company exposes the authorizing directors upon conviction to
fines (not exceeding S$20,000) and imprisonment (not exceeding two
years) .95
I. INSIDER TRADING
Another significant change in the 1984 Amendments concerns insider
trading. Common law did not consider directors fiduciaries subject to a
duty to disclose material inside information. 96 The building of trust in
financial markets, a cause Singapore strongly supports, can be accom-
plished by precluding individuals with special information from using it
to their advantage until it has become public. Consequently, the 1967
Companies Act (as well as other statutes) attempts to curtail insider trad-
ing directly and indirectly.97 Insider trading cases are still relatively un-
common in Singapore98 because the stock market is young and investors
are largely unaware of their rights. When such instances do occur, how-
ever, the difficulties of apprehending the wrongdoers are considerable. 99
The 1984 Amendments, therefore, attempt to strengthen enforcement. 100
91. Section 162(l)(d) of the Companies Act.
92. Section 162(6) of the Companies Act.
93. Section 163(5) of the Companies Act.
94. Section 163(2) of the Companies Act.
95. Sections 162(4) and 163(7) of the Companies Act.
96. See Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, cited in TAY, supra note 47, at 100.
97. Insider trading is regulated by the Companies Act, the Securities Industry Act of 1973
supra note 34, and the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers of 1979. Indirect insider
regulation is through registers of shareholdings as required by section 69 A-N (substantial
shareholdings), sections 134-134A (Director's Interests) of the Companies Act, and sections
26-30 of the Securities Industry Act of 1973 (securities). The new Singapore Securities
Industry Act 1986, (effective August 1986) has expanded the takeover provisions of the
Companies Act.
98. But see the Haw Par case, mentioned in TAY, supra note 47, at 99. See also the recent
Pan-Electric debacle, which caused the Singapore stock market to close for several days in
November 1985. Singapore Strained by Crisis in Stocks, New York Times, Dec. 5, 1985,
at D8.
99. The Singapore Stock Exchange was created on May 24, 1973, at which time it was
separated from the Malaysian Stock Exchange with which it had been united since 1963.
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Section 157 of the Companies Act provides for corporate remedies. If
an officer or agent of a company takes unfair advantage of his position,
he must return any profits he makes to the company and may be liable
for fines (up to S$5,000) and imprisonment (one year). 101 Section 158
provides a remedy for those who have dealt with insiders. 102 Section 87
of the Securities Industry Act provides for remedies against securities
market professionals.103
Although the first and last provisions remain unchanged, the 1984
Amendments alter section 158 in several ways. The term "insiders,"
originally confined to officers, agents, and employees, now includes "sub-
stantial shareholders," defined as holders of not less than five percent of
the shares. 1° 4 Originally only securities traded on the stock exchange
were affected. The 1984 Amendments apply to insider trading of securities
whether traded on the stock exchange or elsewhere. The statute of lim-
itations runs for two years after completion of the insider trade, or (under
the Amendments) for six months after the victim's discovery of the rel-
evant facts in relation to the dealing. 10 5 The definition of inside information
has been changed from "specific" to "special" confidential information,
which means any confidential fact or circumstance of whatever nature
that would affect the price of the securities of the company. ' 0 6 Although
For a history of the Singapore Stock Exchange, see TAN CHWEE HUAT, supra note 20, at
3-12.
100. Following the Pan-Electric incident, Singapore decided to revise again its insider
trading laws. See Singapore Stock Exchange Regroups After Pan-Electric; Opens Door to
Foreign Firms, Bus. AsIA, Apr. 28, 1986, at 131.
101. Sections 157(2) and (3) of the Companies Act.
102. Section 158 reads in part:
(1) An officer, agent, employee or substantial shareholder of a corporation who in or in
relation to a dealing in securities by himself or any other person makes use to gain,
directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or any other person of special confi-
dential information acquired by virtue of his position as such officer, agent, employee
or substantial shareholder which, if generally known, might reasonably be expected
to affect materially the price of the subject-matter of the dealing shall, in addition to
any penalty imposed under section (9), be liable to a person for loss suffered by that
person by reason of the payment by him or to him of a consideration in respect of
the securities greater or lesser, as the case may be, than the consideration that would
have been reasonable if the information had been generally known at the time of the
dealing.
(2) An officer, agent, employee or substantial shareholder of a corporation is not liable
under subsection (1) to a person for any loss suffered by that person if that person
knew or ought reasonably to have known of the information referred to in subsection
(1) before entering into the transaction relating to the dealing in securities of the
corporation.
103. Section 87 of the Securities Industry Act 1973.
104. Section 81 of the Companies Act defines substantial shareholder.
105. Section 158(3) of the Companies Act.
106. Section 158(1) of the Companies Act.
VOL. 21, NO. 2
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SINGAPORE 375
this change resulted from prior controversial court cases, the effect of
the difference remains unclear.107
The penalty for insider trading is increased to up to S$100 thousand or
five years imprisonment. 10 8 Moreover, the insider must reimburse the
victim for the amount the shares reasonably would have been worth had
the information been publicly known. 109 If, however, the victim knew or
"ought reasonably to have known" of the inside information, the insider
is not liable.110
The last change, section 158(10) of the Amendments, concerns tippees,
a group not covered by the older Act. A tippee is a person who deals on
the basis of inside information received from an insider. If a tippee knows
or "ought reasonably to have known" that the information was acquired
by the insider because of his position, the tippee may be liable for a fine
up to S$50 thousand or imprisonment for up to three years.I' A tippee's
victim, however, may not seek damages from either the tipper or the
tippee.
VI. The Aftermath of the 1984 Amendments
Almost immediately after passage of the 1984 Amendments, the Regis-
trar intensified enforcement efforts, bringing charges against 155 company
directors for being persistently in default. Fifty-four of those pleaded
guilty and were fined from S$150 to S$1,200, for a total of more than S$30
thousand. Twenty-five were acquitted, and seventy-six have gone to trial. "12
The double liquidation provision brought even more commotion. While
recognizing the importance of an open and honest business environment,
many claimed that with this provision Singapore had gone too far. Those
who were accustomed to serving as directors (e.g., attorneys, bankers,
and accountants) began to decline such assignments. Instead a new group
of directors emerged, comprised of persons with little to lose. For in-
stance, unemployed persons or Philippine maids were recruited for a fee
107. For instance, in Public Prosecutor v. G. Choudhury, the issue was whether a financial
crisis was specific information under then section 158. The trial court said it was. The
appellate court overruled, stating that "facing a financial crisis is a subjective statement
and not an objective one, precisely and unequivocally expressed." Reinstating the decision
of the trial court, the High Court held that a company's financial situation "is the kind of
specific information anyone familiar with the market knows that can markedly affect the
prices of the particular shares and can result in the suspension of the trading of the shares
on the Stock Exchange." See [1981] MALAYAN L.J. 77, 79.
108. Section 158(9) of the Companies Act.
109. Section 158(1) of the Companies Act.
110. Section 158(2) of the Companies Act.
111. Section 158(10)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act.
112. The Straits Times, Jan. 8, 1985, reprinted in TAY, supra note 47, at 32.
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to serve as directors in name, while real managers were running the
company.
At this time of heightened enforcement and creative lawbreaking, eco-
nomic growth in Singapore began to taper off. In 1985 Singapore expe-
rienced a severe decline with the first decrease in its GN.113 Blamed for
the recession were such outside forces as worldwide falling oil prices, the
global shipping debacle, and the shrinking export market in the United
States. Blamed too were Singapore's overregulation, the rigidity in its
economic management system, its slow reaction to market forces, and its
autocratic, paternalistic attitude. Singapore's high wage policy of the late
1970s was also criticized as having jeopardized its regional competitive-
ness. In addition, Singapore's unusually high savings rate (41 percent),
which resulted from compulsory contributions to the Central Provident
Fund, was claimed to be economically unhealthy. "1 4 Another reason given
is that the Chinese population of Hong Kong stayed in Hong Kong and
did not move their businesses to Singapore as had been anticipated.
After recovering from the initial shock of the recession, however, Mr.
Lee has charted a new course. In the short run, Singapore will seek to
stimulate the economy through tax reductions. Starting in April 1986,
corporate income taxes were reduced from 40 percent to 33 percent. The
amount of the employer's contribution to the Central Provident Fund has
been lowered from 25 percent to 10 percent. And future wage increases
will be tied to productivity and no longer directed by the Wage Guidelines
Committee. In the long run, Singapore may slowly denationalize its in-
dustry and return it to private entrepreneurs.115
Meanwhile the Companies Act is under revision.1 16 The main objects
of the current proposals are twofold: to obligate companies to make earlier
and fuller disclosures, and to expand the powers of the court in dealing
with failing companies and with irregularities under the Act.'1 7 Clearly,
the purpose is to increase the Government's authority over companies.
113. See, e.g., Talib, Singapore: Highlights of the Report of the Economic Committee,
4 ASIAN-PACIFIC TAX & INVESTMENT BULL. 103 (1986).
114. See e.g., Future of 'Plato's Republic', supra note 8.
115. See Singapore's New Budget Cuts Taxes, Hikes Spending to Revive Ailing Economy,
Bus. ASIA, Mar. 31, 1986, at 98; Does the Recession Mean a Watershed in Singapore?, Bus.
ASIA, Apr. 7, 1986, at 108; see also Riding It Out, ASIAWEEK, July 5, 1985, at 28-40.
116. Companies (Amendment) Bill No. 9/86, introduced in Parliament Mar. 31, 1986. The
Bill is presently before the Parliamentary Select Committee.
117. See Explanatory Statement Bill No. 9/86, at 120. The bill, among other things, makes
more extensive provisions for consolidated accounts of companies; recasts the restrictions
in which financial assistance may be given by a company for the acquisition of its own
shares; refines the rules on registration of a prospectus; enlarges disclosure of directors'
benefits; and confers wider powers on the Court to deal with irregularities in proceedings
under the Act.
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On the other hand the current proposals would also relax the double
liquidation provision of the 1984 Companies (Amendment) Act. The pres-
ent provision disqualifies a person who was director of liquidated Com-
pany A at any time within three years of its liquidation, and of liquidated
Company B at any time. The bill adds the same three-year cut-off period
to the Company B directorship.118 Thus, if a person has resigned within
three years prior'to either Company A's or Company B's liquidation, he
does not face automatic disqualification for other directorships, even though
Company A and Company B both went bankrupt within a five-year span.
Still, the disqualification remains automatic, requiring the director to con-
vince the court of his fitness to serve as a director for other companies.
One important exception to automatic disqualification, however, is that
a director may defend himself by proving that at the time he resigned
from Company A or Company B either the entity had not begun to transact
business or he was unaware of an impending insolvency.'l 9
VII. Conclusion
A Singapore directorship is fraught with risks. In addition to the usual
duties of loyalty and care, the Singapore Companies Act recognizes stat-
utory duties, many of which are subject to criminal penalties. Failure to
hold meetings or to file documents exposes even responsible directors to
severe penalties, as does involvement more than once with failing com-
panies. Resignation may be impossible and insurance unavailable. Above
all, the Registrar watches with great scrutiny.
There are, of course, several ways to reduce these risks: Know your
colleagues and avoid being the last remaining director; do not accept
honorary directorships except as they may benefit your business; keep
track of all directorships, past and present, and continue to check regularly
118. Clause 22 of the Companies Amendment Bill, amending section 149 of the Companies
Act.
119. Clause 22, adding new subsections (6) and (7) to section 149 reads in part:
(6) It is a defence to a prosecution under subsection (1) if the defendant proves-
(a) that, at the time he resigned as a director from a company to which subsection (1)
applies, the company had not commenced business or exercised any borrowing
power from the date of incorporation of the company; or
(b) that he was not aware of a fact or occurrence the existence of which was necessary
to constitute the offense and that
(i) he was not so aware on the date of the summons; or
(ii) he became so aware before the date of the summons and within 4 weeks there-
after he applied to the court for leave under this section.
(7) For the purpose of subsection (6)(b), a person shall conclusively be presumed to have
been aware of a fact or occurrence at a particular time of which he would, if he had
acted with reasonable diligence, have been so aware at that time.
Although part of a major revision of the Companies Act, it is expected that section 149
will be amended separately shortly.
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the financial position of those companies at the Registry of Companies
for at least three years following resignation; call meetings; file papers.
In short, ensure compliance with the law. Keep abreast of corporate
developments, speak out when asked, and sometimes speak out even
when not asked.
Singapore stands at the world's crossroads as a major regional entrepot
and shipping center. Although Mr. Lee may retire soon, his successor
will be carefully selected and trained.120 That successor may not follow
the exact example of Mr. Lee, but does modern Singapore really need or
want the same stern hand? 12 1
In its young history, Singapore has proved its resilience. Singapore
survived the Japanese occupation, the transfer from British rule, a com-
munist insurgence, and the separation of Malaysia. Today, the outlook is
that Singapore will prevail again, in this case over the present economic
recession. By controlling corruption, and by consolidating and expanding
its economic and strategic stronghold, Singapore should remain an at-
tractive financial and business center for Asia and a stable long-term host
for foreign investment. With this economic forecast, the need for Sin-
gapore directors will remain strong.
120. Mentioned is Mr. Lee's son, the thirty-four-year old Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, but the
favored candidate appears to be Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Goh Chok Tong. See Future
of 'Plato's Republic', supra note 8, at 17.
121. As expressed by a Singapore secretary: "But my children will never stand for what
we put up with in our generation. They have had a good life all along, and they are going
to make a change. Even a blind man can see that." Future of 'Plato's Republic', supra
note 8, at 17.
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